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Abstract: 
The privatization of the water industry has aroused interest in comparing the performance of 
public vs. private water companies. However, little research has been conducted to compare 
the performances of full private (FPWCs) and concessionary water companies (CWCs). This 
study estimates and compares the productivity growth and its drivers (efficiency, technical 
and scale change) for a sample of Chilean FPWCs and CWCs over the 2007–2015 period 
using the input distance function. Both types of water companies showed deteriorations in 
productivity growth, with CWCs exhibiting higher rates of negative productivity growth than 
FPWCs. For FPWCs, any gains in efficiency and scale were outstripped by negative technical 
change. CWCs did not improve their performance in any of the three components of 
productivity change. The comparison of productivity change between FPWCs and CWCs is 
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essential to support decision-making therefore, this study is of great interest for policymakers 
worldwide who are developing policies aimed at privatizing water companies.
Keywords: environmental factors; performance; privatization; productivity growth; quality 
of service; water and sanitation industry. 
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1. Introduction
Efficient management of water companies (WCs) is essential to ensure sustainable urban 
water activities. Performance assessments of WCs are relevant and have strong implications 
for regulators, utilities, customers, and stakeholders (Pinto et al., 2016; Dong et al., 2018). 
Since the 1980s, many studies have used different benchmarking methods to evaluate and 
compare the performances of water utility companies around the globe (Haider et al., 2016). 
Some research has focused on assessing the efficiency of water utility companies through 
static comparisons of their performance levels (Tutusaus et al., 2018). This approach provides 
information on WCs assessed at a given moment in time. Alternative studies have evaluated 
the change in productivity of WCs. Unlike efficiency studies, productivity change studies 
integrate the temporal component in the assessment (Portela et al., 2011) and focus on how 
the performance levels of WCs change over time (O’Donnell et al., 2017).
After the pioneering privatization of the English and Welsh water industry in 1989, 
several countries privatized some or all of their WCs. Since then, there has been controversial 
debate, politically and scientifically, about the appropriateness of privatizing utilities 
(Cheung and Chan, 2011). Case studies analyzed in the literature (Megginson and Netter, 
2001) evidenced that private sector participation in the water industry is likely to result in 
improved managerial practices and higher operating efficiency. However, published 
literature also provides case studies where privatization of water utilities involved negative 
impacts on the society mainly due to increases in the water tariffs which led to water 
affordability problems (Al-Madfaei, 2017)1. Two major issues that have been investigated 
over the past 20 years include: i) the performance implications of public vs. private ownership 
1 Porcher (2014) studies the impact of privatization on allocative efficiency in the French water industries and 
find no clear impact, i.e. margins are the same in the public and the private sector.
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of WCs (Berg and Marques, 2011; Suárez-Varela et al., 2017), and ii) the change in 
productivity of WCs before and after their privatization (Saal et al., 2007). Most previous 
studies focusing on the second issue have referred to private WCs without taking into account 
that private WCs can be differentiated into two types, full private (FPWCs) and 
concessionary water companies (CWCs), depending on their approach towards privatization. 
For FPWCs, ownership, including infrastructure, is privatized, usually by selling strategic 
participations and shares to private consortia. For CWCs, water and sewerage services are 
privatized for a certain period of time, such that water regulators enter into long-term 
contracts with private entities (Petrova, 2006).
For urban planning and from a policy perspective, it is essential to compare not only 
the productivity change of public vs. private WCs but also of FPWCs vs. CWCs. This 
comparison will provide relevant information to policymakers regarding the proper approach 
for privatizing urban water industries. Despite the usefulness of assessing the productivity 
change of FPWCs and CWCs, to the best of the author’s knowledge, only Molinos–Senante 
and Sala–Garrido (2015) have conducted an empirical case study on this topic. They 
evaluated the productivity change of 18 Chilean WCs, including FPWCs and CWCs, from 
1997 to 2013 by estimating the Luenberger productivity indicator. Although these authors 
pioneered the estimation of productivity change for FPWCs and CWCs, their paper had 
several limitations.
To compute changes in the productivity of WCs, parametric or nonparametric 
methods can be used (Zhang, 2015). The first limitation of the study by Molinos–Senante 
and Sala–Garrido (2015) regards the use of the nonparametric Luenberger productivity 
indicator. This approach does not allow for the control of exogenous factors and quality of 
service. Several papers (see for instance Carvalho and Marques, 2011; Tanner et al., 2018) 
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evidenced the importance of external variables in the performance assessment of WCs. The 
second limitation is that the authors decomposed the total factor productivity change (TFPC) 
into two drivers only: efficiency change (EC) and technical change (TC). This approach 
assumes that a change in the scale of a WC does not influence the change in productivity. A 
third limitation regards the presentation and interpretation of results. Molinos–Senante and 
Sala–Garrido (2015) presented results at the company level without any reference to the type 
of WC (i.e., FPWC or CWC). Moreover, no analysis was conducted to check the statistical 
significance of differences in productivity change between the two types of WCs.
Over the last 30 years, the Chilean water industry has implemented several major 
regulatory and institutional reforms to improve water and sewerage services (Hearne and 
Donoso, 2005). One of the most relevant reforms was the privatization of WCs, which began 
in 1998. Unlike in England and Wales, where all WCs were privatized at the same time 
following a common approach, the Chilean government privatized WCs in two stages 
following two different approaches (SISS, 2015). In the first stage (1998–2000), the five 
main Chilean WCs were privatized as FPWCs. Public WCs sold strategic participations to 
private consortia, with privatization of the public urban water infrastructure. In the second 
stage (2001–2004), public WCs transferred rights for the exploitation of water and sewerage 
services for 30 years, leading to CWCs. In 1998, 92.6% of urban customers were supplied 
by public WCs. In 2015, FPWCs and CWCs combined provided water and sewerage services 
to 95.8% of customers.
The main objective of this paper was to evaluate if there are any differences in the 
performance between FPWCs and CWCs. In doing so, we estimated and compared the TFPC 
values (and its drivers: EC, TC, and SC) of a sample of FPWCs and CWCs. An empirical 
application was carried out, which focused on the 22 main Chilean WCs (12 FPWCs and 10 
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CWCs) over the 2007–2015 period which provide water and sewerage services to 98% of the 
urban population. 
To the best of the knowledge of the authors, no study estimate and compared so far 
the TFPC of FPWCs and CWCs using a robust parametric method that allows for the control 
of exogenous factors and inclusion of quality of service issues that might influence 
productivity growth. Another innovation of the paper is the assessment of the impact of SC 
in the TFPC of FPWCs and CWCs.
Urban planners (local government) and water regulators are responsible for ensuring 
that the new urban developments have high quality drinking water and sewerage services 
(Gabrielsoon et al., 2018). Hence, the findings of this study contribute to better understand 
the dynamic of WCs by comparing the productivity change of FPWCs and CWCs. This 
information is essential to develop sound policies. Results about the comparison of TFPC 
and its drivers between FPWCs and CWCs are essential to support the decision-making 
process in selecting the approach to the privatization of WCs. In the year 2000 alone, 93 
countries had municipalities that carried out some form of WC privatization (Petrova, 2006). 
Hence, it is essential that policymakers make informed decisions to promote the long-term 
technical and economic sustainability of WCs.
2. Methodology
To evaluate the TFPC of the analyzed WCs and the influence of the quality of services on 
TFPC, this research follows the methodological approach proposed by Saal et al. (2007) 
(Figure 1). 
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Step 1
• Select the water companies (FPWCs and CWCs) to be evaluated
Step 2
• Definition of the inputs, outputs and quality and environmental variables to be 
integrated in the performance assessment model
Step 3
• Collect data for each water company evaluated over the time period analysed
Step 4
• Estimate the input distance function (Eq. 1)
Step 5
• Compute the Generalized Parametric Production Index (GPPI) (Eq. 3)
Step 6
• Decompose the total factor productivity change (TFPC) into efficiency change 
(EF), technical change (TC) and scale change (SC) for each water company (Eq.5)
Figure 1. Main steps to evaluate and compare the TFPC and its driver for FPWCs and CWCs
Some previous papers (e.g., Antonioli and Filippini, 2001; Bottasso and Conti, 2009) 
estimated cost functions to evaluate both the productivity growth and profit change of WCs. 
By contrast, the present study applies the distance function approach, because there are no 
available data about all input prices to build a cost frontier and therefore, this study focused 
on assessing the TFPC of WCs. Following Orea (2002), Mugisha (2007), and Mellah and 
Ben Amor (2016), among others, this study uses the input distance function to characterize a 
production technology having multiple inputs and outputs. 
The input distance function yields the maximum deflation factor that should be 
applied to an input set  to project it onto the efficient frontier of input set . For output 𝑥 (𝐼𝑡(𝑦))
vector  at time , the input distance function is defined as:𝑦 𝑡
            (1)𝐷𝐼(𝑦,𝑥,𝑡) = 𝑚𝑎𝑥{𝛿 : 𝑥𝛿 ∈  𝐼𝑡(𝑦), 𝛿 > 0}
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This function enables computation of the technical efficiency of the WCs because 𝐷𝐼(𝑥,𝑦,𝑡)
, where  is a Farrell measure of the input technical efficiency (Ferro and = (1
𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡𝐼
) ≥ 1 𝑇𝐸𝑖𝑡𝐼
Mercadier, 2016). In accordance with previous studies, this paper uses an input-oriented 
approach to assess the performance of WCs (Worthington, 2014). This approach involves 
that performance improves by reducing the use of inputs for a given level of outputs. In the 
water industry, as in other network industries, the demand of outputs (i.e., drinking water and 
wastewater treatment services) is outside the control of managers, who mainly act on 
minimizing the use of inputs for water and sewerage services (Pinto et al., 2016).
Orea (2002) defined the Malmquist parametric productivity index (MPPI) as the 
weighted index of output change minus the weighted index of input change, employing input 
distance elasticities to estimate the weights of inputs and outputs. The MPPI is defined as 
follows:
    (2)ln 𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 =‒ 12∑𝐾𝑘 = 1(𝜀𝑘𝑡 + 1 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡)(ln (𝑦𝑘𝑡 + 1𝑦𝑘𝑡 )) ‒ 12 ∑𝑀𝑚 = 1(𝜀𝑚𝑡 + 1 + 𝜀𝑚𝑡)(ln (𝑥𝑚𝑡 + 1𝑥𝑚𝑡 ))
where  and .𝜀𝑘𝑡 = ∂𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼(𝑡)/∂𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑘 𝜀𝑚𝑡 = ∂𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼(𝑡)/∂𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑚
 is homogeneous of degree one in inputs; therefore, the weights of the input change 𝐷𝐼(𝑥,𝑦,𝑡)
must sum to unity. By contrast, the output weights do not sum to unity (Saal et al., 2007) due 
to the effects of non-constant returns to scale. Increasing returns to scale involve economies 
of scale because an expansion of output can be achieved with a less-than-proportionate 
increase in all inputs. If outputs increase by less than the proportional change in inputs, then 
there are decreasing returns to scale (Carvalho and Marques, 2015).
Saal et al. (2007) modified the MPPI so that the output weights were non-negative 
and summed to unity by definition, and the input weights were non-negative and summed to 
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unity because of the homogeneity of degree one of the input distance function. Hence, it 
integrates in the assessment economies of scale. The generalized parametric productivity 
index (GPPI) which is defined as follows was applied in this study:
ln 𝐺𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 = ln 𝑀𝑃𝑃𝐼𝐼 + 12∑𝐾𝑘 = 1(( 𝜀𝑘𝑡 + 1∑𝑗 = 𝐾
𝑗 = 1 𝜀𝑗𝑡 + 1) + ( 𝜀𝑘𝑡∑𝑗 = 𝐾𝑗 = 1 𝜀𝑘𝑡))(ln (𝑦𝑘𝑡 + 1𝑦𝑘𝑡 )) ‒ 12
            (3)∑𝑚 = 𝑀𝑚 = 1 (𝜀𝑚𝑡 + 1 + 𝜀𝑚𝑡)(ln (𝑥𝑚𝑡 + 1 + 𝜀𝑚𝑡))
Following Caves et al. (1982), to implement the GPPI, the quadratic identity lemma 
is applied to the input distance function, as follows:
‒ ln (𝐷𝐼(𝑦,𝑥,𝑡 + 1)𝐷𝐼(𝑦,𝑥,𝑡) ≡‒ 12∑𝑚(𝜀𝑚𝑡 + 1 + 𝜀𝑚𝑡)(ln (𝑥𝑡 + 1𝑚𝑥 𝑡𝑚 )) ‒ 12∑𝑘(𝜀𝑘𝑡 + 1 + 𝜀𝑘𝑡)(ln (𝑦𝑡 + 1𝑘𝑦𝑡𝑘 )) ‒ 12
           (4)[∂𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼(𝑦,𝑥,𝑡 + 1)∂𝑡 + ∂𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼(𝑦,𝑥,𝑡)∂𝑡 ]
Given that the input distance function is the inverse of the Farrell technical efficiency, then 
, and the TFPC is decomposed into three components:‒ 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝐼(𝑡) = 𝑙𝑛𝑇𝐸𝐼(𝑡)
                                                                                                (5)𝑇𝐹𝑃𝐶 = 𝐸𝐶 + 𝑇𝐶 + 𝑆𝐶
Following Saal et al. (2007), this paper uses the translog approach to estimate the 
input distance function, where and  are units (WCs) and time indices, respectively. There 𝑖 𝑡
are  inputs ,  and  outputs , , and abbreviating :𝑀 𝑥𝑚 𝑚 = 1…𝑀, 𝐾 𝑦𝑘 𝑘 = 1…𝐾 𝑥𝑚 ≡ (𝑥𝑚 𝑥𝑀)
‒ 𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑀,𝑖,𝑡 = 𝛼𝑖 +
∑𝑀 ‒ 1
𝑚 𝜃𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑚,𝑖,𝑡 + 12∑𝑀 ‒ 1𝑚 ∑𝑀 ‒ 1𝑛 𝛾𝑚,𝑛𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑚,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑛,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝑘𝜋𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 12∑𝑘∑𝑙𝛽𝑘,𝑙𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑘,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑙,𝑖,𝑡 + ∑𝑀 ‒ 1𝑚 ∑𝑘𝜙𝑚,𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑚,𝑖,𝑡𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑘,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝜓1𝑡 + 12𝜓2𝑡2 + ∑𝑀 ‒ 1𝑚 𝜂𝑚𝑙𝑛𝑥𝑚,𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∑𝑘𝜅𝑘𝑙𝑛𝑦𝑘,𝑖,𝑡𝑡 + ∑𝑝𝜉𝑝𝑧𝑝,𝑖,𝑡 + 𝑣𝑖𝑡 ‒ 𝑢𝑖,𝑡
            (6)
 are stochastic errors (assumed to measure inefficiency), drawn from an independent half-𝑢𝑖,𝑡
normal distribution that is truncated at zero. The term  captures the impact of  ∑𝑝𝜉𝑝𝑧𝑝,𝑖,𝑡 𝑝
environmental and quality variables on input requirements, allowing the estimated input 
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distance function to capture better the true relationship between inputs and outputs (Saal et 
al., 2007). 
Intercept parameter  accounts for heterogeneity of the analyzed WCs. This 𝛼𝑖
parameter is obtained through the true fixed effect method, proposed by Greene (2005), and 
it allows for the control of other factors influencing input requirements that have not been 
specifically controlled in the model. Following Greene (2005), maximum likelihood 
techniques are used to allow for firm-specific fixed effects and time-varying inefficiency 
specification. The unknown parameters to be estimated are as follows: , , , , , 𝛼𝑖 𝜃𝑚 𝛾𝑚,𝑛 𝜆𝑘 𝛽𝑘,𝑙
, , , , , and .𝜙𝑚,𝑘 𝜓1 𝜓2 𝜂𝑚 𝜅𝑘 𝜉𝑝
3. Sample and Data Description
Statistical information from the WCs evaluated was extracted from the management 
reports of water and sewerage services published by the national urban water regulator 
(Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios, SISS) from 2007 to 2015. 
Chilean WCs are multi-output producers, providing water supply and wastewater 
collection and treatment services. Following past evidence (Molinos–Senante et al., 2016a; 
Pinto et al., 2016; Li and Phillips, 2017), this study considered two outputs: i) the volume of 
water distributed, expressed in thousands of cubic meters of water produced annually, and ii) 
the number of customers with access to wastewater treatment services. Three inputs were 
assessed: i) the main length, defined as the sum of the water and sewerage networks (in km), 
which was used as a proxy for capital costs (Ananda, 2014, Ferro and Mercadier, 2016); ii) 
operating costs (Chilean pesos/year), defined as the total operating costs of the water and 
sewerage industries, deflated by the consumer price index taken from national statistics; and 
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iii) number of employees, which represents labor input expressed as the number, not cost, to 
impose the homogeneity assumption. Environmental and quality of service variables that are 
expected to influence TFPC were: i) customer density, defined as the number of customers 
per length pipe (customers/km); ii) nonrevenue water, defined as the percentage of water that 
was produced and not charged due to real and apparent losses (Neamtu, 2011); iii) drinking 
water quality; and iv) wastewater treatment quality. Nonrevenue water was included because 
Molinos–Senante et al. (2016b) found that most Chilean WCs have not solved their large 
nonrevenue water problems. The last two variables were measured by the water regulator as 
quality indicators between 0 and 1, with a value of 1 indicating that the water company met 
all legal requirements regarding the quality of drinking water (e.g., concentrations of 
pollutants) and the quality of wastewater treatment (e.g., sampling issues). Table 1 shows 
average values of data used to evaluate TFPC values for FPWCs, CWCs, and the whole 
sample of water companies from 2007 to 2015.
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1 Table 1. Average of the inputs, outputs and environmental variables of the 22 Chilean water companies evaluated.
2 Source: Own elaboration from Superintendencia de Servicios Sanitarios data.
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16 * Operational costs were adjusted to nominal CLP by the Chilean Consumer Price Indexes.
Inputs Outputs Quality and environmental variables
Year
Operational 
costs (103 
CLP/year)*
Network 
length 
(km)
Number 
of 
employees
Water 
distributed 
(m3/year)
Customers 
with access to 
wastewater 
treatment
Non-
revenue 
water (%)
Customers 
density 
(Customer/km)
Drinking 
water 
quality
Wastewater 
treatment 
quality
2007 23,397,348 3,748 625 60,486 788,246 30 53 0.867 0.970
2008 22,832,776 3,818 630 60,598 812,300 31 54 0.932 0.967
2009 23,745,518 3,842 642 61,031 831,005 31 54 0.931 0.996
2010 28,792,440 3,902 660 62,037 892,262 32 55 0.973 0.973
2011 30,171,184 3,942 651 64,406 904,867 31 55 0.964 0.948
2012 30,361,100 3,990 677 65,401 896,116 32 56 0.964 0.958
2013 33,690,775 4,035 669 66,424 919,928 32 57 0.961 0.943
2014 35,505,561 4,070 698 67,750 944,041 31 58 0.963 0.990Fu
ll 
pr
iv
at
e 
w
at
er
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
2015 32,414,941 4,122 722 68,602 968,138 30 59 0.983 0.962
2007 11,107,588 1,695 347 18,260 304,470 31 55 0.91 0.974
2008 11,129,458 1,755 356 18,637 315,087 31 55 0.942 0.988
2009 14,879,487 1,777 379 19,110 324,875 30 55 0.961 0.987
2010 15,556,148 1,810 389 19,463 345,596 31 55 0.985 0.976
2011 16,359,463 1,865 393 22,092 353,143 29 55 0.98 0.961
2012 17,627,481 1,884 403 21,442 338,755 28 54 0.984 0.956
2013 19,291,969 1,907 425 21,970 347,514 28 55 0.991 0.986
2014 20,982,211 1,927 448 22,365 355,472 28 55 0.984 0.986C
on
ce
ss
io
na
ry
 w
at
er
 
co
m
pa
ni
es
2015 22,645,793 1,968 466 22,937 362,952 28 55 0.988 0.987
2007 18,053,974 2,855 497 42,127 577,908 30 54 0.886 0.972
2008 17,744,377 2,921 504 42,354 596,120 31 54 0.936 0.976
2009 22,151,591 2,944 521 42,804 610,948 31 54 0.944 0.992
2010 23,037,530 2,992 536 43,527 654,582 31 55 0.978 0.974
2011 24,166,087 3,039 533 47,096 664,987 30 55 0.971 0.954
2012 24,824,744 3,074 551 46,280 653,785 30 55 0.973 0.957
2013 27,430,424 3,109 557 47,096 671,052 30 56 0.974 0.962
2014 29,191,061 3,138 584 48,017 688,142 30 57 0.972 0.988T
ot
al
 sa
m
pl
e 
of
 
w
at
er
 c
om
pa
ni
es
2015 28,167,485 3,179 605 48,747 705,013 29 57 0.986 0.973
ACCEPTED MANUSCRIPT
13
17 4. Results 
18 Estimated results from the input distance function are reported in Table 2. Firm-specific 
19 effects i.e., the intercept parameter  ranged from 3.299 to 3.663 for FPWCs and CWCs, 𝛼𝑖,
20 respectively. The range of 0.364 suggested that the time-invariant heterogeneity of operating 
21 characteristics not otherwise controlled in the model accounted for small but important 
22 differences in the input requirements of the WCs. 
23 Regarding monotonicity and curvature conditions, the estimated results confirmed 
24 that the input distance function was nondecreasing in inputs and nonincreasing in outputs, as 
25 shown by their first-order coefficients. The estimated input distance function was concave 
26 because the Hessian matrix of the translog input distance function with the second-order 
27 coefficients and the interaction term between inputs as elements was negative and semi-
28 definite (Simon and Blume, 1994). There were some violations of the quasi-concavity 
29 assumption with respect to outputs. These violations did not imply the absence of an 
30 underlying cost-minimization process but may have reflected the inability of the translog 
31 input distance function to approximate the true input distance over the range of data (Wales, 
32 1977). In particular, 79% (or 21%) of the observations satisfied (or violated) the quasi-
33 concavity assumption in outputs. As Färe et al. (2010) and Wolf et al. (2010) noted, the 
34 translog function may lose flexibility when subjected to curvature restrictions. 
35 Overall, the estimated translog input distance function was acceptable, and all 
36 variables were normalized around their means. Thus, the first-order coefficients of the 
37 outputs and inputs can be interpreted as the distance function output and input elasticities, 
38 respectively, for the average water company of the sample.
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39 Estimated input elasticities were all positive and statistically different from zero, 
40 implying that the distance function was increasing with respect to inputs. Input elasticities of 
41 network length, operational costs, and labor were 0.767, 0.178, and 0.055, respectively. 
42 Number of employees was used as the normalized variable in the distance function. Its 
43 elasticity was recovered from the sum of the elasticities of the network length and operational 
44 costs. This finding suggested that network length and operating costs were the main drivers 
45 of increased input requirements to supply water and treat wastewater. Moreover, the high 
46 network length elasticity implied that the Chilean water and sewerage industry was capital-
47 intensive.   
48 Table 2. Estimated parameters of the input distance function. Labour input is the dependent 
49 variable.
Variables Parameter Coeff St.Error T-stat
Network length 𝜃1 0.767 0.018 41.736*
Operational costs 𝜃2 0.178 0.018 9.815*
Water distributed 𝜋1 -0.309 0.021 -14.537*
Wastewater customers treated 𝜋2 -0.664 0.022 -29.683*
Time 𝜓1 -0.010 0.002 -6.305*
Network length2 𝛾1,1 -0.693 0.027 -25.803*
Network Length * Operational costs 𝛾1,2 -0.013 0.021 -0.594
Operational costs2 𝛾2,2 0.378 0.049 7.768*
Water distributed*Network length 𝜙1,1 -0.124 0.067 -1.848**
Wastewater treated * Network Length 𝜙2,1 0.280 0.066 4.214*
Water distributed*Operational costs 𝜙1,2 0.445 0.055 8.067*
Wastewater treated * Operational costs 𝜙2,2 -0.528 0.050 -10.619*
Water distributed2 𝛽1,1 -0.286 0.031 -9.150*
Wastewater customers treated2 𝛽2,2 -0.241 0.029 -8.200*
Water distributed*Wastewater treated 𝛽1,2 0.254 0.028 8.972*
Network Length * Time 𝜂1 -0.008 0.002 -4.096*
Operational costs * Time 𝜂2 -0.013 0.004 -3.101*
Water distributed*Time 𝜅1 -0.017 0.004 -4.453*
Wastewater customers treated * Time 𝜅2 0.021 0.003 6.377*
Time2 𝜓2 0.003 0.001 3.693*
Customer density 𝜉1 -2.487 0.027 -92.730*
Customer density2 𝜉2 0.404     0.007 58.568*
Wastewater treatment quality 𝜉3 -0.479 0.089 -5.356*
Drinking water quality 𝜉4 -0.208 0.027 -7.620*
Non-revenue water 𝜉5 -0.036 0.009 -4.137*
𝜎 0.144 0.002 48.979*
𝜆 5.841 0.469 12.435*
Log likelihood function 239.668
Average technical efficiency 0.912    
50 * Coefficients are significant from zero at the 5% level
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51 ** Coefficients are significant from zero at the 10% level.
52 Output elasticities were statistically significant. Thus, providing wastewater 
53 treatment to more customers required more input than providing additional volumes of water. 
54 This is because increase in the volume of water supplied will take advantage of economies 
55 of scale whereas provide wastewater service to more customers will increase operational 
56 costs and number of employees (inputs) since the network will be bigger. The scale elasticity 
57 (i.e., sum of the inverses of the output elasticities) was 1.027 at the sample mean. In other 
58 words, a 1% increase in outputs would require an increase in inputs of 0.973%. Consistent 
59 with this result, Ferro and Mercadier (2016) reported increasing returns to scale in the Chilean 
60 urban water industry from 2005 to 2013. The second-order coefficient of customers provided 
61 with drinking water and wastewater treatment services was positive and significant, 
62 suggesting that these outputs were not complementary. This finding was consistent with the 
63 results of previous studies carried out in various settings (Saal and Parker, 2006).
64 Elasticities of network length and operational costs were negative and statistically 
65 significant over time. Thus, water companies increased capital-investment programs to 
66 improve the network, and the operational costs increased the input requirements over time. 
67 The estimated coefficient of the time factor was negative and statistically significant, 
68 suggesting that the average firm in the sample underwent technological regression at a small 
69 rate of 1%. Costs increased annually in part because of technical regress. However, the time-
70 squared coefficient was relatively small and positive, suggesting that the estimated rate of 
71 technical change increased at 0.03% per year. Coefficients of time related to each of the input 
72 variables were negative and statistically significant, suggesting that water companies 
73 experienced technical regress resulting in increasing input requirements with respect to 
74 network length and operational costs. The statistically significant parameter of the interaction 
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75 term between time and outputs suggested that technical change increased the relative 
76 magnitude of the number of customers of wastewater treatment services, whereas it decreased 
77 the relative magnitude of the elasticity of the amount of water supplied. 
78 Density and density squared showed negative first-order and positive second-order 
79 terms. This result suggested that as population density increased, the input requirements 
80 increased. However, this effect would eventually be exhausted at sufficiently high levels of 
81 population density. Therefore, WCs operating in low-density areas might be less efficient 
82 than companies operating in high-density areas. In more densely populated areas, the input 
83 requirements may decrease because a company with a relatively high customer-to-network 
84 length ratio might use shorter pipes and, hence, have lower distribution costs (Torres and 
85 Morrison, 2006; Bottasso and Conti, 2009). This finding seemed to confirm the existence of 
86 economies of density in the Chilean water industry, consistent with past research in various 
87 settings (Kirkpatrick et al., 2006; Picazo–Tadeo et al., 2009; Mellah and Amor, 2016). 
88 Elasticities of input requirements with respect to the drinking water quality and 
89 wastewater treatment quality were negative and statistically significant. This finding 
90 suggested that investments in improving the qualities of drinking water and wastewater 
91 treatment led to higher input requirements. Finally, increased nonrevenue water resulted in 
92 higher input requirements, which may be attributed to increased investments associated with 
93 the detection, repair, and control of water loss.
94 Average TFPC values for the Chilean WCs (Table 3) illustrated notable reductions in 
95 values for FPWCs and CWCs from 2007 to 2015. Although TFPC was negative in both cases, 
96 it was markedly larger for CWCs than for FPWCs. This finding was consistent with the 
97 results of Molinos–Senante and Sala-Garrido (2015), who suggested that Chilean FPWCs 
98 exhibited better performance across years than CWCs. For FPWCs, the worsening of 
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99 productivity was due to the negative shift of the efficient frontier because the average EC and 
100 SC values were positive. By contrast, for CWCs, the three drivers of TFPC (i.e., efficiency 
101 change, technical change, and scale change) were negative. This result suggested that CWCs 
102 did not improve their performance in any of the three components of the TFPC. 
103 Table 3. Average values of efficiency change, technical change, scale change and total factor 
104 productivity change from 2007 to 2015 expressed in percentage.
Efficiency 
change 
(%)
Technical 
change 
(%)
Scale 
change 
(%)
Total factor 
productivity 
change (%)
Full private 0.75 -12.54 3.87 -7.93
Concessionary -2.14 -5.94 -5.79 -13.89
Total sample 0.48 -9.47 -1.27 -10.26
105
106 To test whether the TFPC and its drivers differed significantly between FPWCs and 
107 CWCs, nonparametric Mann–Whitney and Kolmorov–Smirnov Z tests were carried out. The 
108 null hypothesis was that TFPC, EC, TC, and SC would not be significantly different between 
109 FPWCs and CWCs. The -values for these tests (Table 4) illustrated that the null hypothesis 𝑝
110 could be rejected for TC and SC, but not for EC and TFPC. Distributions of the TC and SC 
111 values among CWCs and FPWCs were statistically significant. On the other hand, although 
112 large, the difference in the average TFPC values between FPWCs and CWCs was not 
113 statistically significant. Thus, it cannot be concluded that FPWCs generally presented better 
114 performance across years than CWCs. This finding revealed the importance of verifying 
115 results from a statistical perspective, to avoid obtaining biased conclusions.
116 Table 4. -values of Mann-Whitney and Kolmorov-Smirnov tests𝑝
Efficiency 
change
Technical 
change
Scale 
change
Total factor 
productivity 
change
Mann-Whitney 0.863 0.000 0.043 0.618
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Kolmorov-Smirnov 0.503 0.001 0.031 0.753
117
118 Next, this paper sought to identify trends in the evolution of the productivity change 
119 across years. Figure 2 shows the average values of TFPC for the FPWCs, CWCs, and total 
120 sample of WCs evaluated year by year. Detailed results at the company level are reported as 
121 supplemental material. The TFPC of the Chilean water companies was positive for only one 
122 year, 2011/12. Thus, there was significant reduction of productivity during the period 
123 assessed. The increase in the use of inputs was not balanced by growth in the provision of 
124 water and sewerage services. 
125 Two patterns can be differentiated for the productivity change of FPWCs and CWCs. 
126 From 2007 to 2011, although both types of water companies showed worsening productivity, 
127 CWCs exhibited worse performance (lower TFPC values) than FPWCs. In particular, from 
128 2007 to 2011, TFPC declined by 12.5% and 6.5% for CWCs and FPWCs, respectively. By 
129 contrast, from 2011 to 2015, there was no clear pattern in the productivity change of the WCs. 
130 From 2012 to 2014, FPWCs and CWCs presented an opposite behavior. In the 2012/13 
131 period, the TFPC of the FPWCs increased, whereas CWCs showed a reduction in 
132 productivity. During the next year, the opposite behavior was observed; the TFPC of the 
133 FPWCs declined, whereas the TFPC of the CWCs showed a positive behaviour. 
134
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136 Figure 2. Average values of total factor productivity change for the total sample analyzed, 
137 for full private and concessionary water companies.
138 To understand better the drivers of productivity change of Chilean WCs, average 
139 values of EC, TC, and SC of the FPWCs and CWCs were plotted (Figures 3 and 4). The 
140 efficiency change, or catching-up index, reflected the capacity of water companies to be 
141 managed on the efficient frontier. Positive values of EC can be attributed mainly to 
142 managerial improvements (Simoes and Marques, 2012). For FPWCs, remarkable 
143 improvement of the EC was observed in the 2009/10 period (2.98%). This improvement 
144 compensated for the small decrease of this driver in subsequent years, leading a positive 
145 average value for the 2007–2015 period. EC showed greater variability for CWCs, with 
146 alternating positive and negative values across years. From a managerial perspective, this 
147 finding means that in average terms, FPWCs made more efforts to adopt better management 
148 practices than CWCs. Nevertheless, neither FPWCs nor CWCs exhibited positive values for 
149 EC in all of the years of the analyzed period. This finding suggested that Chilean WCs did 
150 not implement specific plans for improving management issues in the long term. 
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152 Figure 3. Drivers of the total factor productivity change (TFPC) for full private water 
153 companies
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156 Figure 4. Drivers of the total factor productivity change (TFPC) for concessionary water 
157 companies
158 The second driver of TFPC, technical change measures the change in the efficient 
159 frontier between two periods (Molinos–Senante and Sala-Garrido, 2015). Average TC values 
160 of FPWCs and CWCs were negative for all 9 years evaluated (Figures 3  and 4). From 2007 
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161 to 2015, there was a steady regression of the efficient frontier. In the last years, the 
162 deterioration of TC was smaller than at the beginning of the period for both FPWCs and 
163 CWCs, but TC remained negative. Regulatory reform is one of the main driving forces to 
164 improve TC, making these findings very relevant for urban water regulators. Despite efforts 
165 made at the national level by regulators, reforms adopted in recent years were not sufficient 
166 to strengthen the Chilean water industry. This deficiency may be due to several reasons, with 
167 the small number of WCs providing water and sewerage services being among the most 
168 important. Twenty-two WCs supply water to 98% of the urban population. The eight largest 
169 Chilean WCs belong to two economic groups that provide water and sewerage services to 
170 79% of urban customers. Under this ownership, it is difficult for regulators to introduce 
171 reforms to promote competitiveness, innovation, and, therefore, productivity among WCs.
172 The scale change reflects the type of returns to scale presented by the WCs. Positive 
173 SC values imply economies of scale, while negative SCs imply diseconomies of scale 
174 (Maziotis et al., 2014). Neither FPWCs nor CWCs presented a clear tendency regarding the 
175 presence of economies of scale (Figures 3 and 4). For both types of WCs, the SC contributed 
176 positively to TFPC in some years but negatively in others. FPWCs had larger variability in 
177 SC values than CWCs, as evidenced by the maximum and minimum average SC values of 
178 +3.7% and -2.9%, respectively. Such variability in SC is unusual worldwide. Nevertheless, 
179 our findings were consistent with previous studies focused on the Chilean water industry, 
180 which were inconclusive about the presence of economies of scale (SCL Econometrics 2009; 
181 Molinos–Senante et al., 2015; Ferro and Mercadier, 2016). In this context, Ferro and 
182 Mercadier (2016) concluded that the different results regarding economies of scale between 
183 previous studies were due to differences in methodology. However, the present study 
184 suggested that there was inconsistency in the presence of economies and diseconomies of 
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185 scale for the Chilean WCs depending on the year. In some years, Chilean WCs presented 
186 increasing returns to scale, whereas they presented decreasing returns to scale in other years. 
187 This issue greatly complicates long-term planning by water regulators because there is no 
188 clear sign that favors or disfavors the horizontal integration of WCs.  
189
190 5. Implications
191 Results (Figure 2) illustrate that the performance of the Chilean WCs changes across 
192 years, which may be due to several factors. In the framework of water governance, Berg 
193 (2016) identified seven elements affecting water sector performance: ideas, institutions, 
194 interests, information, incentives, ideals, and individuals. In the case of the Chilean water 
195 industry, FPWCs and CWCs share some of these factors, including institutions, incentives, 
196 interests, and ideals. Thus, according to Berg’s (2016) methodological framework, the three 
197 main factors explaining performance differences between Chilean WCs are ideas, 
198 information, and individuals. Ideas are understood as the different conceptual frameworks to 
199 support decision-making processes. Data collection, verification, and analysis are essential 
200 to identify best practices and establish realistic targets. Finally, leadership is a relevant factor 
201 to improve water sector performance (Berg, 2016). Given that the Chilean WCs evaluated 
202 are private they do not share a common framework to support decision-making. Moreover, 
203 quality of service and efficiency targets are different among WCs. Both issues contributed 
204 unequivocally to the different performance between companies.
205 Based on the empirical application carried out in this study for the Chilean water 
206 industry, the following policy recommendations are proposed. Firstly, from this study it can 
207 be concluded that Chilean WCs (both FPWCs and CWCs) present notable economies of 
208 density. It indicates that significant cost savings can be achieved if WCs provide water and 
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209 sewerage services in compact cities. This means that water companies to better understand 
210 the costs to deliver water and treat wastewater between urban and rural areas and develop 
211 strategies and make informed decisions to manage their assets more efficiently (e.g. more 
212 mains may need to be laid in rural than urban areas) so that they can achieve cost savings in 
213 those areas where significant costs exist. Secondly, the results of this study confirm that 
214 FPWCs present positive economies of scale which means that if WCs increase their size they 
215 can reduce their costs. The opposite occurs for CWCs. Hence, the water regulator should 
216 develop policies to encourage the merging of FPWCs forming larger WCs. However, at the 
217 same time the water regulator should promote innovation in order to increase the efficiency 
218 and quality of service of the WCs. Finally, CWCs have negative efficiency change across 
219 years whereas FPWCs presented positive values. This indicates that CWCs have not 
220 improved (or have done so to a lesser extent than FPWCs) their operational practices. Hence, 
221 the water regulator should introduce incentives for all water companies to adopt the water 
222 industry best practices.
223
224 6. Conclusions
225 This manuscript contributes to the current strand of literature in two main aspects. It evaluates 
226 and compares the productivity change for FPWCs and CWCs. Moreover, it assesses the 
227 impact of exogenous factors and quality of service on water companies´ efficiency. Finally, 
228 it evaluates the impact of efficiency change, technical change and economies of scale in the 
229 productivity performance of both types of WCs. 
230 The empirical application conducted is this study to compare the performance of 
231 Chilean FPWCs and CWCs led to several interesting conclusions. First, FPWCs and CWCs 
232 showed reductions in their productivity growth, with CWCs exhibiting higher rates of 
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233 negative TFP growth than FPWCs. Second, for FPWCs, any gains in EC and SC were 
234 outstripped by negative TC. Less efficient FPWCs improved their efficiency relative to the 
235 most frontier company, whereas the frontier company did not improve its performance over 
236 time. An average FPWC showed increasing returns to scale, suggesting that larger FPWCs 
237 can reduce their costs through scale effects (e.g., mergers among FPWCs). It evidenced that 
238 water regulators should target policies to encourage the merging of FPWCs forming larger 
239 WCs and promoting the adoption of best practices in the water industry. Moreover, CWCs 
240 did not improve their performance in any of the three components of productivity change. 
241 The major determinants in the deterioration of their productivity were the negative scale 
242 effect and TC. Effective long-term strategic planning and timely capital investment are 
243 needed to improve the technical efficiency. Hence, the study shows that national-level 
244 reforms that have been adopted in recent years have not been sufficient to strengthen the 
245 Chilean water industry. In conclusion, despite expending more efforts to adopt better 
246 management practices, FPWCs did not perform better than CWCs. 
247 From a policy perspective, the findings of this study can be of great importance for 
248 researchers, urban planners, and policymakers for several reasons. First, the methodology 
249 employed allows the identification of factors that affect productivity change over time, which 
250 could aid regulators and managers to define measures that can be employed to improve 
251 performance in a regulated industry. Second, the comparison of different types of 
252 privatization will allow urban planners and policymakers to make decisions regarding the 
253 privatization approach to be taken. Finally, this study will improve understanding on the 
254 relative importance of various productivity components, which are essential to policymakers 
255 to make informed decisions for the sustainable and efficient management of water 
256 companies.
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257 As a limitation to our study, we acknowledge that our case study only integrates four 
258 environmental and quality of service variables. This is due to the limited number of Chilean 
259 WCs. Future research should evaluate the TFPC on a larger sample of water companies which 
260 will allow to integrate additional environmental and quality of service variables that may 
261 affect the performance of both FPWCs and CWCs. Moreover, as future research we will 
262 extend our database by including information on prices for inputs so we can estimate and 
263 decompose productivity growth by using cost frontier approaches.
264
265 NOMENCLATURE
266 CWCs: concessionary water companies
267 EC: efficiency change
268 FPWCs: full private water companies
269 GPPI: generalized parametric productivity index
270 MPPI: Malmquist parametric productivity index
271 SC: scale change
272 TC: technical change
273 TFPC: total factor productivity change
274 WCs: water companies
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HIGHLIGHTS
The productivity of full private and concessionary water companies was compared over the 
2007-2015 period.
Stochastic frontier techniques were used to compute productivity and its drivers
Drinking water and wastewater treatment quality along with non-revenue water contributed 
significantly to the productivity regression 
Full private and concessionary water companies presented positive and negative economies 
of scale, respectively.
